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INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY, 
Intervenor. 
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4 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, William and Marie Averett (Averetts 
hereinafter) appeal from an adverse judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County, The Honorable George E. 
Ballif, District Judge, dismissed the Averett's Complaint for 
adverse possession, no cause of action, quieted title in and to 
approximately two acres of farmland we^t of Springville, Utah 
County in the defendant-respondent Utah County Drainage District, 
(Drainage District hereinafter) No. 1, and awarded the Drainage 
District all funds tendered to the Court by the Intervenor, 
Intermountain Power Agency (IPA hereinafter). 
On or about April 30, 1968, Averetts purchased property from 
Joseph C. and Naida R. Williamson receiving a Warranty Deed 
naming Marie Averett as sole grantee (R. ,300-307). Averetts did 
not see or receive a copy of the deed until this cause of action 
arose (R. 306-446). The Warranty Deed 4 e s c r i b e d a rectangular 
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parcel 01 rarmiana wesu or ^pringville, Utah County, Utah, 
consisting of approximately 20 acres and enclosed by a fence (R. 
306-307). The Warranty Deed excluded: 
that portion of the above-described property sold to 
Utah County Drainage District No. 1, a corporation, 
by Warranty Deed dated July 31, 1934, executed by 
Chillian F. Packard and Phoebee S. Packard, his wife, 
recorded April 3, 1935, as Entry No. 3091, in Book 
316, Page 50, records of Utah County, Utah. (R. 214). 
Shortly after Averetts purchased the land, they sold the west 
half (R. 310) and retained the east 10.19 acres (R. 337, 346). 
The property subject to this dispute is the area within the 
Averetts remaining 10.19 acres which was deeded by Chillian F. 
Packard to the Drainage District and excluded on the deed 
conveying the Williamsons' interest in the property to the 
Averetts. The disputed area is a 66 foot wide strip of land 
running from the southeast corner, within and adjacent .to the 
east boundary and fence line of the Averett property to 
approximately 15 feet south of the northern border of the Averett 
property. From there the 66 foot wide strip runs west almost 
parallel with the northern boundary and fence line of the Averett 
property until the strip continues past the west boundary and 
fence line of the Averett property. (See defendant's Exhibit No. 
11). The disputed property consists of approximately two acres 
(R. 374). 
The Averetts and the Drainage District discovered the 
Drainage District's interest in the disputed strip when the IPA 
offered to purchase the entire 10.19 acres. The IPA, Averetts 
and the Drainage District stipulated to a price of $30,000.00 for 
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the disputed parcel, such parcel being subject to tne rinai 
disposition of this case. The IPA tendered the funds to the 
District Court and judgment was entered condemning the property 
in fee for the use and benefit of the IPA |(R. 245-246). The IPA 
has subsequently constructed and is currently operating a coal 
rail car maintenance facility on the property. 
A drainage ditch, which was constructed in 1919 or 1920, (R. 
453-457, 473-474) was in place along the eastern strip of the 
disputed property. The ditch then turns west and runs between 
the Averetts1 northern boundary and fence line and the northern 
strip of the disputed property. (See defendant's Exhibit No. 
11). 
The average width of the channel of water in the ditch is 
normally four to five feet unless the channel is blocked. Then 
it expands to approximately eight feet (iR. 481-485, 494, 503). 
From the edge of the bank of the ditch to the water surface level 
measures approximately eight to ten feet (R. 372-373). 
After purchasing the land in 1968, the existing fences 
surrounding the 10.19 acres, including the disputed property, 
were maintained by William Averett or neighboring property owners 
(R. 322-324). Those fences allowed Averetts to maintain a feed 
lot with up to 200 head of cattle on the property at various 
times of the year (R. 324-328, 447, 479, 531, 534). Although the 
adequacy of the fences from 1968 until this dispute arose is 
disputed by the Drainage District, (R. 491|-492, 528-529, 533) the 
fence line was recognized as the outside perimeter of the Averett 
3 
property (R. 308, 322-324, 479-480, 512, 528-529, 533). 
Inside the fence and partially on the disputed parcel, 
Averetts built a corral, loading chute, and shed (R. 315-317, 
466, 479). Averetts also built a corn silage pit partially on 
the disputed parcel and excavated through the banks of the ditch 
in order to drain water out of the pit and into the ditch (R. 
317-320, 466, 479). The exact size of the silage pit is 
disputed but evidence ranged from 100 feet by 40 feet (R. 321) to 
25 feet by 50 feet (R. 532, 495). The Averetts never received 
any notice from the Drainage District or anyone else that they 
had invaded Drainage District property by building a corral, 
loading chute, shed and silage pit (R. 328). This is true even 
though Drainage District personnel saw the construction in the 
ditch and on the disputed parcel (R. 447, 459, 461, 479, 495). 
The Averetts otherwise indicated their ownership claim in 
the disputed property by placing "NO TRESPASSING" and "NO 
HUNTING" signs on the gate and fences surrounding the property 
(R. 336). The Averetts also excluded trespassers when the 
occasion required (R. 336). 
The Utah County Tax Assessment was based on the entire 10.19 
acres, including the disputed property each year from 1968 until 
this dispute arose (R. 337-342, 449-450). Also, until this 
dispute arose, the Drainage District assessed its tax as 
authorized under Title 19 of the Utah Code Annotated at the rate 
of 50 cents per acre on the entire 10.19 acres, including the 
disputed property in which the Drainage District held fee title 
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(R. 418-425, 433-434). The Averetts always paid the taxes as 
assessed either by Utah County or the Drainage District (R. 345, 
448). 
The Drainage District was organized on November 4, 1918 as a 
Municipal Corporation under the predecesslor to Title 19, Utah 
Code Annotated (R. 213). In 1919 or 1920, the Drainage District 
constructed the open drains including the irain on the disputed 
property from Utah Lake eastward into tljie fields (R. 454-455, 
470-472). The Drainage District has a r^ght of entry on lands 
for Drainage District purposes under Utah Code Annotated, Section 
19-4-4. The Drainage District constructed the ditch on the 
disputed property under this statutory right of entry (R. 455) 
and continued to use and maintain the ditch under that right of 
entry until the disputed parcel was deeded to the Drainage 
District in 1934 by Chillian F. Packard and Phoebe S. Packard. 
(See defendant's Exhibit No. 17). Arthur C. Boyer was president 
of the Drainage District for approximately 30 years ending in 
1982 (R. 470) and was predecessor to Raph^l Palfreyman (R. 452). 
During Mr. Boyerfs presidency, he understood that the 
Drainage District had only an easement across the disputed 
property (R. 474-477, 495-496) and believe^ that all entry on the 
disputed land by Drainage District personnel was permissive (R. 
475-477). Whenever Mr. Boyer entered the Averetts1 property, he 
entered through a gate maintained by William Averett (R. 479). 
Mr. Boyer was unaware of any fee interest 'in land held by the 
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Drainage District until after the dispute arose (R. 479-480, 482, 
495-496). 
Mr. Palfreyman worked as a maintenance man for the Drainage 
District for four to five years prior to the time he became 
president (R. 451-452). As president and an employee of the 
Drainage District, Mr. Palfreyman understood and believed that 
his entry on the disputed property was under right of an easement 
(R. 460, 463, 467, 546-547) and was unaware of the Drainage 
Districts fee interest in the property until this dispute arose 
(R. 461, 530-531). Mr. Craig Giles Crandall, secretary of the 
district at the time of trial and Mrs. Jesse Packard Condee, Mr. 
Gilesf predecessor as secretary, were both unaware of the 
Districtfs ownership of any real property until after this 
dispute arose (R. 429-430, 435). 
Generally, the only method of maintaining the ditch was by 
walking along the ditch bottom with a shovel to remove debris (R. 
458-459, 477). The Drainage District has not used heavy 
equipment to clean or maintain the ditch since its construction 
in 1919 or 1920 (R. 458). Only once or twice has a jeep or pick-
up truck been taken on the disputed property with a load of rocks 
to be used to maintain the ditch (R. 481, 485). 
Statements by Mr. Palfreyman as president of the Drainage 
District were that the Drainage District had no specific plans 
for the property owned (R. 461, 546). It was only after the IPA 
searched title and surveyed the property that the Drainage 
District became aware of its interest in the disputed property 
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(R. 430, 435, 460, 490). It was at this same time that the 
Averetts became aware that they did not own the interest in the 
disputed property (R. 188, 345). As part >f the agreement with 
the Drainage District, the IPA agreed in its "Stipulation of 
Immediate Occupancy" to: 
provide in its construction on the property for the 
irrigation and drainage facilities th^ it presently 
exist on the property pursuant to the requirements 
and permits of Springville City. 
5. Petitioner and Intervenor shall not during the 
course of modification or alteration of the irrigation 
and drainage facilities or during the course of 
construction of its other facilities, unduly or 
unreasonably interfere with the irrigation and drainage 
facilities and rights of defendant... 
7. Defendant Utah County Drainage District No. 1, 
reserves to itself, and petitioner in intervention 
grant to defendant, Utah County Drainage District No. 
1 , an easement for purposes of maintenance of its 
drainage facilities. The location ^nd description of 
said easement shall be as agreed by said parties 
(R. 64). 
IPA has completed construction of £ pipeline rerouting a 
portion of the ditch, granted an easerient to the Drainage 
District in the area where the ditch runs and will maintain the 
ditch across its property (R. 462-463, 547). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Averetts adversely possessed the approximately two acre 
disputed property based on their belief of ownership and not 
based on a written instrument. Therefore Section 78-12-10, Utah 
Code Annotated applied. 
The Averetts purchased the farmland in 1968 unaware of the 
exclusion of the disputed parcel. From 1968 until 1983 they 
believed and acted as if the land were theirs. Both the Averetts 
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and Drainage District Personnel believed that the District 
maintained the drainage ditch across the Averett property 
pursuant to a statutory or prescriptive easement. Drainage 
District personnel were unaware of the District's fee interest in 
the property until the IPA agreed to purchase the land from the 
Averetts. 
Under Section 78-12-10, Utah Code Annotated, the Averetts 
adversely possessed the land by continued occupation of the land 
under a claim of title. They excluded all others by placing "NO 
TRESPASSING11 and "NO HUNTING" signs on the perimeter fences. 
Drainage District personnel always entered through the gates and 
did so on the mutual belief of a statutory right of entry granted 
in Utah Code Annotated 19-4-4 or the existence of an easement. 
In Kouri v. Burnette, 416 P.2d 963 (Ok. 1966), Burnette 
adversely possessed land of a third party despite the private 
easement of ingress and egress Kouri had acquired. KouriTs use 
of the easement did not disturb Burnetts' exclusive possession of 
the property. In Stark v. Stanhope, 206 Kan. 428, 480 P.2d 72 
(1971), Stark adversely possessed land held by a municipal 
corporation cemetery district subject to the Cemetery District's 
easement of ingress and egress to other cemetery property. The 
Court held that the use by Stark of the land for farming purposes 
was similar to other uses of land in the area and that the 
cemetery's use of the roadway for access to its other property 
did not interrupt the exclusive possession of the property by 
Stark. 
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The Averetts* use of the disputed property was similar to 
that of other property in the area while the Drainage District's 
use was believed to be an easement and is dissimilar to other 
properties in the area. Therefore, the Averetts* possession of 
the disputed property was exclusive and cohtinuous as required in 
Section 78-12-10. 
The Averetts also maintained the fences surrounding the 
property at the time of purchase and kept up to 175 or 200 head 
of cattle on the property at various tidies of the year. This 
satisfies the substantial inclosure requirement of Section 78-12-
11(1), Utah Code Annotated. 
The Averetts built a corral, loading chute, sheds and corn 
silage pit next to the ditch near the southwest corner of the 
acreage and partially on the disputed property. The IPA paid the 
Averetts $27,000 for these improvemehts . Therefore, the 
improvement requirement of Section 78-12-11(2) was also 
satisfied. 
Section 78-12-12 requires that alll taxes assessed on the 
property be paid before adverse possession is found. In Utah 
Copper Company v. Chandler, 45 UT 85, 1^ 2 P. 1119 (1914), this 
Court held that if no taxes were lawfully assessed, then taxes 
need not be paid to adversely possess the property. In the 
instant case, the fee was held by the Drainage District which is 
generally not taxed on its property. However, Utah County taxed 
the Averetts for the two acres of the disputed property. Also 
the Drainage District itself taxed the Averetts on the two acres 
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in dispute. The Averetts paid all taxes assessed in a timely 
manner. If these taxes were not lawfully assessed, the Averetts 
did not need to pay those taxes under Utah Copper Company to 
comply with Section 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated. If those 
taxes were properly assessed, then the Averetts paid the 
assessments thereby fulfilling the requirements of that section. 
Because the Averetts continuously occupied the property 
under a claim of ownership for the requisite time period 
excluding all others, inclosed the property with a substantial 
inclosure, improved the property and paid all taxes assessed, 
they have adversely possessed the property. 
The Drainage District did not hold the property for public 
purposes and therefore the Averetts1 adverse possession is not 
barred by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-13* 
In Pioneer Investment and Trust Company v. Board of 
Education of Salt Lake City, 35 UT 1, 99 P. 150 (1909), this 
Court held that property on which the public use has been 
terminated, and the property held for sale is not held for a 
public use and can be adversely possessed. 
The Drainage District in this case was unaware of its fee 
interest in the property for over 30 years just prior to this 
action. All its entries on the disputed property were based on a 
belief of an easement or statutory right of entry. The District 
president admitted that it had no plans for the land; that it was 
not necessary for the District to own land; and that the 
ownership of this land was not critical to the operation of the 
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District. The IPA has granted an easement to the District; 
constructed a pipeline for the water across the property; and 
agreed to maintain the ditch across the property. Therefore, the 
property is not necessary or held for & public use and the 
Averetts adverse possession is valid. 
If it is determined that the ditch itself is a public 
purpose, then portions of the disputed property held by the 
District beyond that occupied by the ditch and used for access 
and maintenance is unnecessary for accomplishment of the 
District's public purpose. That excess is subject to adverse 
possession by the Averetts. 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 11 shows that the ditch is less than 
half the width of the disputed property and that along the north 
end of the property, the ditch is almost entirely on the 
Averetts1 property rather than on th^ disputed property. 
Therefore, the excess property can be adversely possessed by the 
Averetts and title should be quieted in them to such property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE AVERETTS HAD 
NOT ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THEIR 
CLAIM TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The Averetts claim of ownership of the disputed property is 
based on adverse possession of the property for the requisite 
period under a claim of right rather than on a written 
instrument. Therefore, their adverse possession of the property 
is determined under Sections 78-12-10, 78-12-11 and 78-12-12 of 
11 
the Utah Code Annotated. 
A. The Averetts Have Claimed Ownership and Occupied the 
Land Exclusive of Any Other Right. 
Section 78-12-10 of the Utah Code Annotated states: 
Where it appears that there has been an actual, 
continued occupation of land under a claim of title, 
exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a 
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so 
actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to be held 
adversely. 
It was undisputed at trial that the Averetts occupied the entire 
10.19 acre area within their fences, including the disputed 
property as owners of such property from the time of their 
purchase in 1968 through 1983 when this dispute arose (R. 307, 
310, 312-313, 325, 336-337, 342-346, 447, 458-459). During the 
period of their possession, the Averetts held the disputed 
property "exclusive of any other right" even though the Drainage 
District had statutory right to enter the property to maintain 
the ditch under Utah Code Annotated, Section 19-4-4. In Kouri v. 
Burnett, 415 P.2d 963 (Ok. 1966), Burnett adversely possessed 
land held by third parties even though Kouri had an easement of 
ingress and egress to his own property. The Court said: 
The circumstances that the defendant had a private 
easement over the strip did not weaken the exclusive 
character of plaintiff's possession to the extent that 
plaintiff would be precluded from acquiring 
prescriptive title to the strip of land. Id. at 968. 
In Stark v. Stanhope, 206 Kan. 428, 480 P.2d 72 (1971), 
Stark adversely possessed land held by a cemetery district, which 
was a municipal corporation under Kansas law, even though the 
cemetery district used a road across the disputed parcel for 
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in the vicinity which 
212-213), the primary 
access to the cemetery. In that case the j Court held that since 
the Starks1 use of the land was the ordinary use to which other 
land similarly situated was used, the ! cemetery use of the 
property as a roadway was not sufficient tb break the continuity 
of the Starks? exclusive possession and u&e of the remainder of 
the tract. Therefore the Court quieted titile in Stark subject to 
the cemetery district's easement in the property. 
In the instant case, the Averetts us^d the land as a feed 
lot which is similar to farming purposes irj the area (R. 324-328, 
447, 479, 531, 534). The Drainage Distrijct on the other hand, 
used the property in the form of an easement for its drainage 
ditch. Although there are other ditches 
are maintained by the Drainage District (R.j 
use of the land around the area is for farjming and therefore the 
Drainage District's use of the land under its right of entry 
authorized by Section 19-4-4 of the Utah Cdde did not disturb the 
Averetts1 exclusive and continuous possession of the land. 
Therefore, this Court, upon finding the otlier elements of adverse 
possession are satisfied, should quiet ititle to the subject 
property in the Averetts subject to the easement rights of the 
Utah County Drainage District. 
B. The Averetts Protected the Land By a Substantial 
Inclosure and Improved the Land. 
Section 78-12-11 of the Utah Code Annotated states: 
For the purpose of continuing and adverse possession by 
a person claiming title, not founded upon a written 
instrument, judgment, or decree, landjis deemed to have 
been possessed and occupied in the| following cases 
only: 
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(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
Inclosure; 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or 
improved; 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon 
dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for 
the purpose of irrigating such lands amounting to the 
sum of $5.00 per acre. 
Plaintiffs concede that they have not satisfied the third 
requirement of expending labor or money on dams, etc. and that 
the trial courtfs Finding of Fact No. 17 concerning that factor 
of adverse possession is correct. However, the statute is 
disjunctive and only one of the three requirements need be 
satisfied to establish title by adverse possession. Central 
Pacific Railway Company v. Tarpey, 51 Ut. 107, 168 P. 554 (1917). 
1. The Averetts Protected the Property With a Substantial 
Inclosure 
With respect to the first requirement that the property be 
protected by a substantial Inclosure, the trial courtfs Findings 
of Facts Nos. 20 through 23 are clearly erroneous. William 
Averett testified at trial that the entire property was fenced 
when he purchased it (R. 303-304, 357-358) and he fully believed 
that he was purchasing the property within the four fences (R. 
307, 360). He testified that when he purchased the property the 
existing fence on the east side of the property, had been built 
by the railroad (R. 307-308). The fence on the north side of the 
property was in "less than desirable condition" so he constructed 
a new fence along the old fence line (R. 308). Shortly after the 
Averetts purchased the property, they sold the west ten acres to 
his neighbor on the south (R. 310) and together they built a new 
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fence to separate the properties (R. 312-313). That new fence 
and the fence on the south was always kept in TfA-1 condition" by 
his neighbor (R. 313). Mr. Averett testified that he maintained 
the fences in order to keep his cattle in (R. 322-323) or that 
his neighbor to the south and west maintained the south and west 
fences (R. 323). 
Although there is some discrepancy regarding how well 
maintained the fences were, (R. 359, 491-492, 524-527, 533) it 
was still recognized that the property within the four fences was 
the Averetts1 property (R. 479-480, 495, 528-529, 533-534). 
Furthermore, from 1968 to 1983, William Averett maintained a 
cattle feed lot on the entire 10.19 acres within the fences (R. 
324, 447, 478-479, 534) and had 175 to 200 cattle on the property 
at various times of the year (R. 325-328, 531). To further 
protect his property, William Averett put either "NO TRESPASSING" 
or "HUNTING BY PERMISSION" signs on the perimeter fences (R. 
336). 
The fences described above constitute a substantial 
inclosure satisfying Section 78-12-11(1) of the Utah Code and 
therefore the trial courtfs Findings of Fact Nos. 20-23 are 
erroneous and should be reversed. 
2. The Averetts Improved the Disputed Property 
The trial court properly found that the Averetts did not 
usually cultivate the disputed property as stated in Paragraph 18 
of its Findings of Fact. However the Court's finding in 
Paragraph 19 that the Averetts failed to establish by a 
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preponderance of the evidence the size of the silage pit and the 
extent to which it existed on the disputed property is clearly 
erroneous. William AverettTs testimony indicated that he built a 
corral, loading chute and shed (R. 315) on the property next to 
the ditch in the southeast corner of the Averett property 
partially on the disputed land (R. 315-317). The corral was 
constructed out of pine poles and was approximately 40 feet by 
100 feet (R. 319). In 1973, Averetts built a silage pit on the 
edge of the ditch as it ran along the east boundary of the 
Averett property at a cost of $3,700.00 (R. 317-318). The pit 
was four to six feet deep (R. 321). Although testimony varies, 
the silage pit was at least 20 feet by 50 feet (R. 321, 495, 532, 
543). The silage pit drained its excess water into the ditch (R. 
321) and during construction, the bank of the ditch was excavated 
to install a drain pipe from the silage pit (R. 466, 495). When 
IPA negotiated the price of the land and improvements with 
William Averett, they agreed to purchase the land for $15,000.00 
an acre, the silage pit for $25,000.00 and the corral, loading 
chute and sheds for $2,000.00 (R. 344-348). 
These improvements valued at nearly as much as the two acres 
of disputed property were constructed next to the ditch and 
partially on the disputed property. Therefore, they satisfy the 
improvement requirement of Section 78-12-11(2) and the trial 
courtfs Findings of Fact No. 19 is clearly erroneous. 
C. The Averetts Paid All Taxes Assessed By Utah County and 
The Drainage District on the Disputed Property Whether Or Not 
Those Assessments Were Lawful. 
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Section 78-12-12 of the Utah Code Annotated states: 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any Section of this 
Code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for a period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and 
grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law. 
The trial courtf.s Findings of Fact NosL 14 and 15 state: 
14. Utah County has not levied or assessed any real 
property taxes against the real property of defendant. 
15. Plaintiffs have paid all the taxes which were 
levied and assessed against their property which 
adjoins the subject property. Said tax assessments 
included the subject property of the defendant. 
i 
From those Findings it can be said that the county has not 
assessed taxes to the Drainage District for any of its property, 
but Utah County has assessed taxes to 
disputed property in which record titlel 
District (R. 338). The Averetts have paid all taxes assessed to 
them by Utah County on the disputed property (R. 337-339, 341-
342, 449). In addition, the Drainage District itself assessed 
he Averetts for the 
was in the Drainage 
^ 10.19 acres of the 
property, these taxes 
taxes of 50 cents an acre on the entir^ 
Averetts' property including the disputed 
also were timely paid by the Averetts (R. ^38, 419-426). 
In Utah Copper Company v. Chandler, ^5 Ut. 85, 142 P. 1119 
(1914), this Court held that an adverse possessor must pay all 
taxes lawfully levied and assessed against^  the premises claimed 
to obtain title therein. 
If, however, no taxes were lawfully assessed or 
levied against the premises so claimecj and occupied 
by them, they could acquire title by Adverse posses-
sion without payment of taxes. Id. at 11120. 
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In the case at hand, the Averetts paid taxes on the disputed 
property levied by Utah County and the Drainage District even 
though those taxes were assessed unlawfully. Therefore, under 
Utah Copper Company, the Averetts were not required to pay taxes 
unlawfully assessed. Their payment of those unlawful taxes more 
than satisfies the requirements of Section 78-12-12. 
POINT II 
THE AVERETTS CAN ADVERSELY POSSESS THE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
WHICH WAS NOT HELD BY THE DRAINAGE DISTRICT FOR PUBLIC USE. 
Section 78-12-13 states: 
No person shall be allowed any right or title in or to 
any land held by any town, city or county or the 
corporate authorities thereof, designated for public 
use ... or for any other public purpose, by adverse 
possession thereof for any length of time whatsoever... 
That section of the Utah Code Annotated prevents running of the 
statute of limitations for property held for public purposes by a 
municipal corporation. However, in Pioneer Investment and Trust 
Company v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 35 Ut. 1, 99 P. 
150 (1909), this Court held that a similar predecessor statute 
applied "only to property which is devoted to a special public 
use." Id. at 153* In that case, the school board ceased using 
the disputed property for school purposes and held it for sale 
for ten to fifteen years prior to the actions giving rise to the 
case. The Court determined that the statute was not applicable 
because the property was not held for public purpose. 
In Sisson v. Koelle, 10 Wash. App. 746, 520 P. 2d 1380 
(1974), the trial court found that Clallam County, the Sissons 
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predecessor in interest, "had abandoned ahd forgotten about and 
had done nothing to sustain any title, or Ownership or control of 
the land in questions.ff Id. at 1383. Thej Court of Appeals held 
that Koelle had adversely possessed thd property against the 
county when the county never devoted, reserved or set apart the 
property for use as a public right of way 0r for any other public 
purpose. 
In the case at hand, the Drainage District president, Mr. 
Boyer, who was president for 30 years up until 1982, was unaware 
that the Drainage District owned any property anywhere until he 
heard of the IPA desire to purchase the property (R. 482, 490, 
496). During his years as president, Mr. Boyer always believed 
the Drainage District had an easement to access the ditch for 
maintenance purposes (R. 496). Mr. Palfre|yman, president of the 
Drainage District from 1982 until trial (Rj. 451) and maintenance 
person for the Drainage District for four to five years prior to 
that time, (R. 452) was unaware of the f§e interest until IPA 
notified him of its desire to purchase the disputed property (R. 
460, 463-464, 466). Mr. Palfreyman always believed that he had a 
right or easement to enter the property tR. 452, 455, 460-462, 
467). In addition, the last two secretaries of the Drainage 
District were also unaware of its fee interest in the property 
until after this dispute arose (R. 429-430^ -34-435). 
The Drainage District was organized in 1918 under the 
predecessor of Title 19 of the Utah C^ lde Annotated. Under 
Section 19-4-4 of the Utah Code Annotated, Drainage District 
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personnel: 
may go upon said lands with their servants, teams, 
tools, instruments, or other equipment, for the 
purpose of constructing [the drains], and may 
forever thereafter enter upon said lands, as 
aforesaid, for the purpose of maintaining or 
repairing such proposed works. 
It is undisputed that the drain was built and constructed in 
1919 or 1920 (R. 453-457, 473-474). From that date until 1934 
when the Packards deeded the disputed property to the Drainage 
District, the District did not own the ditch as stated in 
Paragraph 11 of the trial courts Findings of Fact (R. 215). 
During that time the Drainage District had a statutory right of 
entry to construct and maintain the ditch across the land. 
Testimony indicated that it was never necessary for the Drainage 
District to own the land to accomplish its purpose either before 
or after the deed to the District had been granted (R. 452, 455, 
461, 475-477). Statements by Mr. Palfreyraan indicated that the 
Drainage District didnft need to own land (R. 464-465). Also, 
Mr. Palfreyman indicated that the disputed property was not 
necessary or critical to the operation of the Drainage District 
(R. 546-547) and that the District had no plans for the property 
(R. 461). 
In its negotiation with the parties, IPA agreed to grant an 
easement to the Drainage District across the acquired property 
(R. 63-65, 462-464, 523-524). 
In summary, the Drainage District operated for fourteen 
years from 1920 to 1934 under a statutory right of entry. In 
1934, the District obtained fee title to the disputed property 
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but for at least 30 years prior to this action, Drainage District 
personnel were unaware that it owned the property. All entries 
on the disputed property during that time were under the 
statutory right of entry or a belief of the existence of an 
easement. The Drainage District remained unaware of its fee 
interest in the disputed property until the IPA attempted to 
purchase it. At that time the IPA agrfeed to pay either the 
Averetts or the Drainage District for the property as determined 
in this action, also the IPA granted an easement for the 
continued use of the property. From thede circumstances, the 
trial court should have determined that th^ Drainage District did 
not hold the property for public purpose;! that the plaintiffs 
adversely possessed the disputed property] and that Section 78-
12-13 is not applicable in this case. 
Alternatively, if the property whdre the ditch runs is 
determined to be held for a public purposq, the subject property 
exceeds that amount of property reasonably necessary for Drainage 
District purposes and the excess is not h^ld for public purpose. 
The water in the ditch ranges from fbur to eight feet wide 
(R. 330, 481-485, 494, 503). Expert testimony presented by the 
Drainage District indicated that the afea that the ditch and 
banks occupied as it ran through the 10.19 acres of the Averettsf 
property was approximately one acre (RL 374-375). However, 
defendant's Exhibit No. 11 shows that the ditch and banks only 
lie on the subject property as the ditch ifuns from the southeast 
to the northeast corner of the 10.19 acre|s. From the northeast 
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corner to the northwest corner of the property, the ditch lies 
almost entirely on property to which the fee is held by the 
Averetts. The disputed strip of land is just south of the ditch 
as it runs across that end of the property (See defendant's 
Exhibit No. 11). 
Also, since the ditch on the subject property was 
constructed, the ditch has been maintained generally by Drainage 
District personnel as they walk in the ditch to remove blockages 
and to dig out problem areas (R. 458-459, 488-489, 519-520). 
Drainage District personnel have used a pick-up or jeep to haul 
rocks in to the ditch but only on one or two occasions (R. 481-
482, 486-487). Not since the ditch was constructed has the 
Drainage District used heavy equipment to maintain the ditch (R. 
458-459, 529-530). 
The width of the ditch and land necessary for its 
maintenance is much less than the 66 foot strip on which the 
ditch runs along on the east side of the Averett property along 
the northern side of the property, the ditch is almost entirely 
on the Averett property rather than the disputed parcel. 
Therefore, the excess land not necessary for maintaining the 
ditch along the east and the entire strip along the north should 
be quieted in the Averetts. Therefore, this Court should remand 
the case to establish the extent of the land occupied by the 
ditch and that reasonably necessary for maintenance thereof. 
Title should then be quieted in the Drainage District to that 
portion of the eastern strip of the disputed property as 
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reasonably necessary for Drainage District purposes. The 
remaining portion of the disputed property should be quieted in 
the Averetts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Averetts purchased property enclbsed by a fence less 
approximately two acres deeded in 193^ to the Drainage District 
which is the subject of this dispute. however, they believed 
they owned the entire 10.19 acres including the disputed 
property. For 15 years they treated the property as theirs by 
posting "NO TRESPASSING" and "NO HUNTING" signs on the perimeter 
fences. They allowed the Drainage District personnel to enter 
under a mutual belief of an easement or ri^ht of entry. 
The perimeter fences were maintained and contained from 175 
to 200 head of cattle. The Averetts also placed improvements on 
the property and paid all taxes assessed t>y Utah County and the 
Drainage District itself whether or nd>t lawfully assessed. 
Therefore, the Averetts have adversely possessed the disputed 
property. 
The Drainage District personnel were Unaware of its interest 
in the property for over 30 years prior i to this action. The 
Districts president's belief was that, the property was not 
critical to the operation of the District and all prior entry on 
the land was under a statutory right Of entry or easement. 
Therefore, the property is not held for public use and may be 
adversely possessed. Therefore, title tl 
the portion which is found to be unnecessa 
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b the property, all or 
rv to the public 
purpose of the District, should be quieted in the Averetts. 
Respectfully submitted this (j> day of R-fyv^^^ 
1987. 
Attorney fdtj^Appellant 
lliiu,^^ 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellants' Brief to Mr. David D. Jeffs 
of Jeffs and Jeffs at 90 North 100/East, P. 0. Box 683, Provo, 
Utah 84603 this <P ? day of f&40^-^^-c^
 t 1987. 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
%f:: . 
Ca£e Number 65070 
DECISION 
WILLIAM AVERETT and 
MARIE A. AVERETT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT 
NO* 1, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY, 
Intervenor. 
******** 
In this matter the court finds the issues in favor of 
the defendant and against the plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint 
and the claim there alleged against Utah County Drainage District 
No. 1 alleging title by adverse possession of the subject 
property described as "DP408" as set forth in defendant's Exhibit 
No. 17. 
The property in question having been conveyed by 
Chillian F. Packard and Phoebe S. Packard to Utah County Drainage 
District No. 1 by that deed dated July 31, A.D., 1934. The 
plaintiff having succeeded to an interest in the adjoining 
property pursuant to deed to them on April 30, 1960, from Joseph 
C. Williamson and Nada R. Williamson containing a Mless that 
portion" clause deleting the property above referred to described 
in defendant's Exhibit No. 17 from the operation of the April 30 
deed from Williamson to Averett. 
It having been established by the evidence that the 
Utah County Drainage District Ho. 1 was created in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah whereih it was endowed with 
the powers and status of a municipal corporation, the property of 
which being exempt from real property taxation, and protected 
from being acquired by adverse possession, the findings with 
relation to the foregoing as set forth in the proposed findings 
of fact of defendant are hereby adopted and found to be 
consistent with the evidence, or lack thereof, presented to the 
court at the trial of this matter. 
The court finds the issues in f&vor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff on the counterclaim of defendant to 
quiet its title against any interest or claim of plaintiffs 
herein, and the court similarly adopts the findings of 
defendant's proposed findings of fact and the proposed judgment 
as the findings of the court. All is consistent with the 
evidence or lack of evidence presented at the trial. 
The court will not sign or enter the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment as submitted by counsel for 
defendant until after the expiration of 10 days from the date 
hereof to allow plaintiff an opportunity to file whatever 
objection they may have to the decision of the court. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this *1» O day of November, 1985. 
DAVID D. JEFFS 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law. P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 683 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM AVERETT and 
MARIE A. AVERETT. 
Plaintiffs. FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V8. 
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT 
NO. 1, a corporation. 
Defendant. 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY. Civil No. 65.070 
Intervenor. 
/ 
This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on 
the 17th day of July, 1985, before the Honorable George E. 
Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upon the Complaint of 
plaintiff and the Counterclaim of defendant. The plaintiffs 
were present in Court and represented by their attorney, Allen 
K. Young. The defendant was present in Court and represented 
by its attorney. David D. Jeffs. The Court having heard the 
evidence and arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in 
the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FEB 6 1986 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah County Drainage District No- 1 (herein-
after defendant) was organized on November 4, 1918 as a drain-
age district under Title XIX and has existed since that date. 
The District as such is a municipal corporation. 
2. During the years of 1919 through 1920, 
defendant commenced and completed construction of an open 
drainage district on the subject property. 
3. On the 31st day of July, 1934, a deed from 
Chillian F. and Phoebe S. Packard was executed to Utah County 
Drainage District No. 1 which deed was recorded on April 3, 
1935 as Entry No. 3091, Book 316, Page 50, on the Records of 
the Utah County Recorder. 
4. The above described deed conveyed to defen-
dant the property which is the subject matter of this dispute 
(herein subject property) and which is more particularly 
described as follows: 
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209* 
South 0°30' West and 385.44 feet North 
88°30( West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 31, Township 7 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 
0°30' East 732 feet; thence North 88o30l 
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30' East 480 
feet; thence North 88o30l West 66 feet; 
thence South 0°30* West 515 feet; thence 
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South 
0o30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20l 
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30' West 627 
feet; thence South 88°30' East 66 feet, to 
point of beginning containina 3.32 acres 
more or less. 
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5. Tne aoove aescrioea aeeq turtner conveyed to 
defendant a strip of land approximately 66 feet wide which ran 
generally north and west of the subject property to Utah Lake. 
6. There is no evidence of the grant of an 
easement to defendant for construction of the open drainage 
ditch prior to the above described deed. The evidence fails 
to establish that defendant had acquired a prescriptive ease-
ment prior to delivery of the deed to defendant in 1934. 
7. On the 30th day of April. 1968. Joseph C. 
Williamson and Naida R. Williamson conveyed a certain parcel 
of property encompassing the subject property to plaintiff, 
Marie A. Averett. Said deed was recorded May 1, 1968 as Entry 
No. 4291. Book 1109. Page 365 on the records of Utah County. 
8. The said deed from Joseph C Williamson and 
Naida R. Williamson to Marie A. Averett contained the follow-
ing exclusion: 
LESS that portion of the above described 
property sold to Utah County Drainage 
District No. 1, a corporation by Warranty 
Deed dated July 31. 1934. executed by 
Chillian F. Packard and Phoebe S. Packard, 
his wife, recorded April 3. 1935. as Entry 
No. 3091. in Book 316. Pace 50. records of 
Utah County. Utah. 
9. The plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge 
of the ownership by defendant of the 66 foot wide strip of 
land including the subject property. Plaintiffs had construc-
tive notice by the recording statute and the deed to their 
property of the ownership by defendant of the subject property. 
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10. There is no evidence that the officers and 
agents of the defendant who are alive had actual knowledge of 
the ownership of the subject property* although the recitation 
of $100.00 consideration for the deed to the defendant in 1934 
is evidence that prior officers and agents may have known of 
said ownership. 
11. Since completion of the open drainage ditch 
in 1920, defendant has owned, used and maintained the open 
drainage ditch on the subject property. 
12. Defendant has not intended to abandon nor 
has it abandoned any of the subject property. Defendant has 
not sold nor has it intended to sell any of the subject pro-
perty prior to the time that Intermountain Power Association 
sought condemnation of the subject property. 
13. The entire subject property was reasonably 
necessary for the use and maintenance of defendant's open 
drainage ditch. 
14. Utah County has not levied or assessed any 
real property taxes against the real property of defendant. 
15. Plaintiffs have paid all taxes which were 
levied and assessed against their property which adjoins the 
subject property. Said tax assessments included the subject 
property of the defendant. 
16. Since defendant is a municipal corporation, 
its property is exempt from taxation. Anv taxes levied and 
-4-
assessed against its property, wheter assessed in the name of 
plaintiffs or otherwise, were unlawful. 
17. Plaintiffs have not paid any amounts for 
darns, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the 
purpose of irrigating the subject property amounting to the 
sum of $5 per acre. 
18. Plaintiffs have not usually cultivated the 
subject property. 
19. Plaintiff8 have improved a portion of the 
subject property by the construction of a sileage pit. Plain-
tiffs have failed to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence the size of such such sileage pit and the extent to 
which it lies on the subject property. 
20. Plaintiffs have protected by a substantial 
inclosure a portion of the subject property contained within 
the corral fence. Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence the size of such corral and the 
extent to which such corral encloses the subject property. 
21. The fence on the east of the subject pro-
perty was constructed by the railroad. The fence on the north 
of the property was constructed by a Mr. Forbush. 
22. Plaintiffs did not adequately maintain the 
fence on the east of the subject property nor the fence on the 
north of the subject property to the extent that animals were 
adequately confined or retained within the fences and as such 
the fences were not a substantial inclosure. 
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23. Plaintiff8 have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they .have protected the 
subject property by a substantial inclosure. 
24. Any possession of the subject property by 
the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that other persons, in-
cluding particularly the agents and employees of the defendant 
made use of the subject property. Further, any possession of 
the subject property by plaintiffs was not of sufficiently 
open, notorious, hostile and adverse nature as to bring such 
possession to the knowledge of the agents and employees of 
defendant. 
25. Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence all of the elements necessary to 
permit them to adversely possess the subject property. 
26. Defendant assessed plaintiffs a drainage 
district assessment for the subject property in the amount of 
$1.00 or $1.50 per year for the years 1977 to 1983. 
27. Any assessment by defendant is of such a 
minimal nature that defendant would not be estopped thereby to 
claim the subject property. 
Based upon the foregoing Finding^ of Fact, the Court 
now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs may not adversely possess the 
property of defendant held for public use, 
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2. All of the subject property constitutes 
property held for a public use by defendant, 
3. Defendant has not abandoned or otherwise 
given up any claim to the subject property. 
4. Defendant is not estopped to assert its 
rights to the subject property. 
5. Plaintiff8 have not established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence their claim to the subject property 
by adverse possession. Plaintiffs1 Complaint is dismissed, no 
cause of action. 
6. Defendant is entitled to have the title to 
the subject property quieted to it free and clear of any and 
all claims of the plaintiffs by adverse possession or other-
wise. The subject property is more particularly described as 
follows: 
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209• 
South 0°30' West and 385.44 feet North 
88°30< West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 31. Township 7 South. Range 3 East. 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 
0°30l East 732 feet; thence North BB°30t 
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30' East 480 
feet; thence North 88o30l West 66 feet; 
thence South 0°30l West 515 feet; thence 
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South 
0°30' West 27 feet; thence South 88o20l 
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30' West 627 
feet; thence South 88o30l East 66 feet, to 
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres 
more or less. 
7. Defendant is entitled to all tunds tendered 
by Intermountain Power Agency. 
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Dated and s igned t h i s b day of /^J%<A>*** J.985. 
BY THE COURT: 
J2UL* 
George Of Ballif. Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGS 
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing 
was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Utah County. P. O. Box 
49. Provo. Utah 84603. and a copy to the below named parties 
by placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid. 
this 26th day ot July. 1985. addressed as follows: 
Alien K. Young. Esq. 
Young. Harris & Carter 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3$o East Center 
P*ovo. Utah 84601 
M. Byron Fisher. Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for Intermountain Power Agency 
8Qo Continental Bank Buildina 
S*it Lake City. Utah 84101 
Secretary 
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DAVID D. JEFFS 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law. P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant >rCD p 886 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 683 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 VV7 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURfr OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM AVERETT and 
MARIE A. AVERETT. 
P l a i n t i f f s . J U D G M E N T 
v s . 
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT 
NO. 1. a corporation. 
Defendant. 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY. £ivil No. 65.070 
Intervenor. 
This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on 
the 17th day of July. 1985. before the Honorable George E. 
Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upon the Complaint of 
plaintiff and the Counterclaim of defendant. The plaintiffs 
were present in Court and represented by their attorney. Allen 
K. Young. The defendant was present in Court and represented 
by its attorney. David D. Jeffs. The Court having heard the 
evidence and arguments of counsel, and be ing fully advised in 
the premises, and having heretofore submitted its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. now makes and enters the fol low-
ing: 
J U D G M E N T 
1. Plaintiffs1 Complaint for adverse possession 
of the following described real property is dismissed, no 
cause of action. 
2. Defendant is quieted title in and to the 
following described real property free and clear of any claim 
of plaintiffs by adverse possession or otherwise: 
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209• 
South 0o30( West and 385.44 feet North 
88°30' West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 31. Township 7 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 
0o30' East 732 feet; thence North 88o30l 
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30> East 480 
feet; thence North 88°30< West 66 feet; 
thence South 0°30( West 515 feet; thence 
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South 
0°30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20' 
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30' West 627 
feet; thence South 88°30' East 66 feet, to 
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres 
more or less. 
3. Defendant is awarded all funds tendered by 
Intermountain Power Agency. 
Dated and signed this k day of ^-s^rf^t^^^1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGS 
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing 
was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Utah County. P. O. Box 
49. Provo. Utah 84603. and a copy to the below named parties 
by placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid. 
this 26th day of July. 1985. addressed as follows: 
Allen K. Young. Esq. 
Young. Harris & Carter 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
350 East Center 
Provo. Utah 84601 
N. Byron Fisher. Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for Intermountain Power Agency 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
Secretary 
c* 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12.11 
"Usually cultivated or improved/' 
Property located in city's business dis-
trict, consisting of unimproved vacant 
lots covered with grenscwood brush and 
irregularly depressed from about one to 
three feet below street level, was not 
"usually improved" within meaning of 
subd. (1) by slight leveling of small por-
tion of tho property which was not done to 
extent that was noticeable, by dumping 
of few loads of dirt thereon which did not 
change its appearance or enhance its use-
fulness as property upon which a business 
could be located, by weeding that was 
done in such manner that weeds soon 
flourished again, or by placing building 
upon the property a few months before 
institution of suit in question, preliminary 
work for its placement not baring been 
done for statutory period, since property 
was not improved in manner usual to im-
prove that kind and character of land 
for uses to which it could be put Day v. 
Steele, 111 U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216. 
"Usually improved." 
In order for land to have been "usually 
improved" within meaning of subd. (1), 
changes made must have been of substan-
tial and permanent nature and of such 
type AS would bo suitable for use to 
which particular type of land wns fitted, 
and dinners must have been sufficient to 
apprise anyone that land WAS being used 
in manner in which an owner would so uso 
it and not such as could be mistaken for 
mere occasional trespasses. Day v. 8tcole, 
111 U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216, 
Collateral References. 
Adverse PossessionC=>l|4 ot seq. 
2 C.J.8. Adverse Possession § 88 et seq. 
8 Am. Jur. 2d 188 et acq., Adverse Pos-
session § 105 et seq. 
Adverse possession: sufficiency, at re-
gards continuity, of seasonal possession 
other than for agricultural or logging pur* 
poses, 24 A. L. R. 2d 632. 
Grazing of livestock or gathering of nat-
ural crop as fulfilling traditional elements 
of adverse possession, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818. 
Reputation as to ownership or claim as 
admissible on question of adverse posses-
sion, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770. 
Tacking adverse possession of area not 
within description of deed or contract, 17 
A. L. R. 2d 1128. 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument or judgment 
—Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation 
of land under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded 
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually 
occupied, and no other, is deemed to have been held adversely. 
History: L. 1061, en, 68, § 1 ; O. 1943, held to be exclusive. Jenkins T. Morgan. 
Supp., 104-12-10. 113 U. 534,196 P. 2d 871. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-10 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, { 3 . 
Croat-Reference*. 
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
Adjoining owners. 
After twenty years' occupancy of land 
to fence bordering adjoining property, 
owner may maintain action to prevent en-
croachment of sdjoining owner claiming 
certain land beyond fence. Davis v. Lyn-
ham, 67 U. 283, 247 P. 294. 
delusiveness of statutory methods. 
Statutory methods of acquiring title 
by adverse posaesHion, set out in former 
lections 104-2-7 through 104-2-12, were 
Record title. 
Generally, where a person holds record 
title to one traet and also occupies an ad-
joining area adversely, his conveyance of 
the land to which he holds record title 
does not thereby transfer title to land 
held adversely. Home Owners' Loan Corp. 
v. Dudley, 105 U. 208,141 P. 2d 160. 
Collateral References. 
Adverse Possession<S=>96. 
2 C.J.8. Adverse Possession {227. 
3 Am. Jur. 2d 183 et seq., Adverse Pos-
session § 100 et seq. 
Adverse possession by donee under parol 
gift of land, 43 A. L. K. 2d 6. 
Reputation as to ownership or claim as 
admissible on question of adverse posses-
Hion, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770 
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under written instru-
ment—Tsv,. *v>* nnmA.A nf constituting an adverse possession by a person 
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claiming title, not founded upon a written. instrument, judgment or 
decree land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following 
cases only: 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated 0r improved. 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, 
embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such 
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 68, § 1; 0. 1943, 
ftupp., 104-18-11. 
Compiler's Kotos. 
Tnii section is Identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-11 (Code 194S) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1961, eh. 68, | 8. 
Oroes-Referencee. 
Marketable record title, 67-9-1 et eeq. 
Occupying claimants, 67-6-1 et eeq. 
Boundary by aoquleeoenoe. 
Boundary by acquiescence is an equita-
ble concept governed by the principles of 
equity. Each ease is viewed in its own 
light and the establishment of boundaries 
is predicated usually, but not always, upon 
a period of twenty years or more of pos-
session. It is unrealistic to use the period 
called for in the adverse possession statute. 
King r. Fronk, 14 U. (2d) 188, 878 P. 2d 
893. 
There is no boundary by acquiescence 
where owners of tract vet with buyer and 
by use of a hand compass purported to 
locate the boundary line. Hobson T. Pan-
guitch Lake Corp., 680 P. 2d 792. 
Construction of fence along erroneous 
boundary line does not constitute acquies-
cence of boundary where adjacent land-
owner nine years later had a surrey made 
to establish the true boundary. Hobson T. 
Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d 792. 
Evidence. 
In an action to quiet title, where de-
fendant A proffered evidence that they had 
conatructcd a house snd other buildings, 
fhnt they had fenced the property in ques-
tion, and that the houae had been occupied 
na a aummer house for more than seven 
yours prior to the action, the trial court 
erred in not admitting the evidence of ad 
wmv poM*oa«ion. Affleck v. Morgan, 12 U. 
(2d) 200, 3tf4 P. 2d 6f»3. 
Excluslveness of statutory methods. 
Statutory methods of acquiring tit le 
jnlvrr*e |><)MMCH«Hon, net out in former : 
t ion 
to I 
V fi.'W, liKi 1 \ LM 8 7 1 . 
One who claims title by adverse pos-
session not founded on written instrument 
must bring himself within this section. 
Jenkins v. Morgan, 118 U. 684, 198 P. 
2d 871. 
Operation and effect of section. 
The statute defining what shall consti-
tute adverse possession is of the same 
degree of efficacy as is the atatute of 
fraude. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 
P. 912,| 69 A. L. B. 1417. 
PrescrlptloxL 
Prescriptive rights to easement of way 
can arise only from use and enjoyment 
of way for period of twenty years. Push 
v. Anderson, 22 U. 238, 81 P. 1008. 
Water right*. 
Water rights may be acquired by ad-
verse possession, that is, by continued 
possession thereof for seven years. Spring-
ville % Fullmer, 7 U. 460, 27 P. 677. 
What constitutes advene possession. 
It is not a compliance with rule that 
possession of an adverse claimant must 
be continuous, exclusive, open, hostile, 
notorious, and of such a character aa to 
enable owner to know of invasion of his 
rights, that he let vehicles stand on un-
incloscd and unoccupied ground of an-
other, led or drove horses over it, and 
threw manure and rubbish on it. D. H. 
Peery Estate v. Ford, 46 U. 486, 151 P. 59. 
Claimant could not succeed under this 
acetion even though his occupanev may 
have been open, notorious, peaceable, and 
llV 
10-12 7 through 104 2 12. were held 
e x e l u i i x e Jenkin*> \ Morgan, 11*1 
under claim of right, without showing 
nctualj cultivation or improvement, or 
money expended for irrigation or an in-
c)oaur|r. Central Pac. Bv. Co. v. Tarpey, 
51 r . 107, 168 P. 554, 1 A. L. R. 1319. 
In view of federal atatute entitling one 
to land patent who has been in poaaesaion 
of anjl working mining location for limita-
tion period provided in state statute, 
one in poeaesaion for more thsn twenty 
\ear*j continuously working and improv-
ing lam! for quarrying of limestone, 
caiimjt lie deprived of poaaeaaion bersuse 
l . l l f ^ I »t IM \n.••><<»<! n u \t\Aa n t i i t i n n r / . I n i m 
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when it was suitable only for placer min-
ing where another subsequently and sur-
reptitiously located and filed placer claim 
covering land. Springer v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 61 U. 690, 248 P. 819. 
Defendants failed to cstabliah occupa-
tion or possession of certain land within 
limits of requirements of this section, 
where only evidence of possession con-
sisted of use by defendants of that land 
for gracing of their cattle, whieh use 
was not exclusive inasmuch as third per-
son used the land for same purpose to 
knowledge of defendants without inter-
vention or complaint on their part. Jenkins 
v. Morgan, 113 U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871. 
Repairs and improvements made by co-
tenants in possession to dwellings, build-
ings and fences were insufficient to put 
other cotenants on notice that eotenanta 
in possession were claiming title adversely 
to them, since sueh acts were normally 
consistent with tenancy in common and 
not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 
U. 303, 199 P. 2d 542. 
Maintenance of a fence, payment of 
taxes, and other evidence of possession 
and occupation for over twenty years 
were sufficient to establish ownership as 
against city's claim. Gibbons v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 5 U. (2d) 219, 810 P. 2d 513. 
Collateral References. 
Adverse Poeses*ion*»19-21. 
2 CJ.8. Adverse Posseaaion ( 8 0 et seq. 
8 Am. Jur. 2d $7 et aeq., Advcrae Pos-
session { 19 et seq. 
Acquisition by user or prescription of 
right of way ovdr unlnclosed land, 48 A. L. 
R. 2d 1140. 1 -
Adverse possession baaed on encroach-
ment of building or other structure, 2 A. 
L. R. 3d 1005. r 
Adverse possession involving ignorance 
or mistake as! to boundaries—modern 
views, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1171. 
Adverse possession of common, 9 A. L. R. 
1373. 
Adverse possession of railroad right of 
way, 50 A. L. R. 303. 
Cutting of timber as adverse possession, 
170 A. L. R. 887 
Orasing of livestock or gathering of nat-
ural crop as fulfilling traditioaal elements 
of adverse posseaaion, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818. 
Possession by widow after extinguish-
ment of dower 4B adverse to heirs or their 
privies, 75 A. l i R. 147. 
Reputation as to ownership or claim as 
admissible on question of adverse posses-
sion, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770. 
Use by public as affecting acquisition by 
individual of right of way by prescription, 
111 A. L. R. 2f l . 
Use of property by public as affecting 
acquisition of title by adverse posseaaion, 
58 A. L. R. 3d 1182. 
78-12-12. Possession moat be continuous, and taxes pa id- in no caae 
•hall adverse posseaaion be conaidered established under the provisions of 
any aection of thia code, unless it shall be shown that the land haa been 
occupied and claimed for the period of aeven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have pai<| all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; O. 1943, ship went into Actual possession of certain 
, - - iA i iA<n j 0 t t which had been sold to county for 
unpaid taxes, and immediately thereafter 
Supp., 104-12-12. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 1042-12 (Code 1948) which wsa re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, §3 . 8ection 
104-2-12 wss amended by Laws 1951, ch. 
*9> § l ; that provision is compiled as 78-
12-12.1 herein. The 8upreme Court held 
the amendment was valid despite the re-
peal of section 104-2-12. 
Cross-Reference*. 
Marketable record title, 57 9 1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq. 
Acquisition of title in general. 
Where claimaut under claim of owner-
fenced lota and commenced to Improve 
them, subsequently receiving deed from 
county, held possession was adverse, from 
time of entry, as to all the world except 
county. Welnerl v. 8tearns, 40 U. 185, 120 
P. 490, Ann. Ca^. 1914C, 1175. 
Open, notorious and hostile use and pos-
session of the property and payment of 
taxes thereon, all under claim of right, 
will constitute advene possession. Mans-
field v. Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P. 1160. 
Where defendant and his predecessors 
hud been in actual, open, nnd adverse 
possession of land for statutory period, 
and for seven [successive years hnd paid 
taxes thcteon, I and they were inclosed, 
occupied, and icultivated, title was ac-
195 
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tural or logging purposes, 24 A. L. B. 2d 
632. 
Use of property by public aa affecting 
acquisition of title by advene poeeeeaionf 
56 A. L. B. 8d 1182. 
Law Revlewi. 
Note, Boundaries by Agreement and 
Acquiescence in Utah, 1976 Utah L. Bev* 
221. 
78-1242.1. PoMeition and payment of taxes — proviso — Tax wu«. — 
In no case shall adverse possession be established under the provisions of 
this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all the taxes which have been levied 
and assessed upon such land according to law. Provided, however, that 
payment by the holder of a tax title to real property or his predecessors, of 
all the taxes levied and assessed upon such real property after the delin-
quent tax sale or transfer under which he claims for a period of not lest 
than four years and for not less than one year after the effective date1 
of this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this 
section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish advene 
possession. 
ment in order to establish adverae pot-
aeaaion by a tax title claimant, and re* 
demption from taxes cannot be considered 
aa payment of taxes, Lyman v. National 
Mtg. Bond Corp., 7 U. (2d) 123, 220 P. 
2d 822. 
Judgment waa properly entered for de-
fendanta in a declaratory judgment action 
to determine righte of partiea to realty 
poaaeaaed by defendanta under tax deed 
where plaintiifi had not been in poaaeaaioa 
of the realty for more than twelve years 
prior to the bringing of the action and had 
not paid any taxea thereon since 1932 and 
defendanta held possession under an ap-
parent claim of right adversely to plain-
tiffs for more than seven years by grating 
sheep thereon, the validity of the tax deed 
being immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Live-
stock Co., 13 tJ. (2d) 20, 368 P. 2d 68. 
Collateral References. 
Adverse Posaession£=»79(4); Taxation^* 
805(4). I 
2 C.J.8. Adverse Possession § 138; 85 
C.J.8. Taxation §§ 984, 985. 
3 Am. Jur. 2d 209 et seq., Adverae 
Possession § 124 ct scq. 
History: R. g. 1896 4 O. L. 1907, § 2866; 
O. L. 1917, {6466; &. 8. 1933 * O. 1943, 
104-2-12; L. 1961, eh. 19,11. 
OompUer'e Notee. 
This section reflecta the amendment by 
Laws 1951, eh. 19, J 1 to section 104-212 
(Code 1943). Although aection 104-212 
waa repealed by Laws 1961, eh. 68,18, the 
Supreme Court held that ehapter 19 waa 
not repealed. (See Hanaen v. Morria an-
notated under 78-12-5.1, aupra.) Section 
1 of ch. 58 enacted the successor to 104-
2-12, now compiled aa 78-12-12. 
Repealing Olauae. 
Soction 2 of Laws 1951, ch. 19 provided: 
"8ec. 104-2-5.10 aa amended by chapter 19, 
Laws of Utah 1943 aa amended by chapter 
8, Laws of Utah 1947, ia hereby repealed." 
Oroae-Referencee. 
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et aeq. 
Occupying claimants, 67-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq. 
Payment of taxea. 
Payment of taxes is a necessary require-
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public itreets or ways.—No person 
shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by 
any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated 
for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, 
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any 
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such 
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or 
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for 
200 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-14 
a valuable consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent 
to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or succeasors in interest, 
have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real 
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired. 
Hlatory: L. 1951, ch. 58, | 1 ; 0 . 1943, tiona again it a city, in reapect to a public 
Sappn 104-12-13. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Thia section ia identical to former eec-
tion 104-2-13 (Code 1043) which waa re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, { 8. 
Cross-References. 
Diipoaal of unuaed righta of way, 27-
12-07. 
Highwaya continue until abandoned, 27-
12-00. 
Vacation of highways, 87-12-102 et seq. 
Establishment of a holding by city. 
The city muat have tome semblance of 
title, poaaeaaion or right to use, and mak-
ing a aurvey, destruction of a fence be-
tween the atreet and adjoining property, 
and verbal aaaertion of ownership by the 
city are not sufficient to establish a hold-
ing. Oibbona v. 8alt Lake City Corp., 6 
U. (2d) 219, 310 P. 2d 513. 
Estoppel 
There ia no bar of the statute of limits-
atreet within its boundaries; the city may, 
however, be estopped by ita affirmative 
acts to claim laud aa part of a atreet. 
Wall v. 8alt Lake Citt, 60 U. 603, 168 P. 
766. I 
Where city quitclaimed alley to private 
party in contravention of statute, for 
small consideration, and there waa no 
evidence that property ever waa aaaeaaed 
againat grantee or his successors in inter-
est, and time element was abort and there 
was no replatting or change in whole 
neighborhood to benefit of all adjacent 
landowners, there was no ground for es-
toppel in paia aa against city's right to 
qniet title aa againat parties holding un-
der grantee of quitclaim deed. Tooele 
City v. Elkington, 10b U. 486, 116 P. 2d 
406. 
Collateral References. 
Adverse Poase*sion$=»8(l), (2) . 
2 C J . 8 . Adverse Possession {14 . 
3 Am. Jur . 2d 300, Adverse Possession 
§206. 
78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed possession of landlord.—When 
the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons, the 
possession of the tenant ia deemed the possession of the landlord until 
the expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy, or, 
where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years 
from the time of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such 
tenant may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold 
adversely to his landlord; but such presumption cannot be made after the 
periods herein limited. 
Hlatory: X*. 1061, ch. 68, § 1 ; C. 1943, an agent. Hyndman v. 8towe. 0 II. 23, 83 
Bupp., 104-12-14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This aoction ia identical to former sec-
tion 104-214 (Code 1943) which waa 
repealed by Lawa 1951, ch. 68, { 3. 
Cross-He f erences. 
Landlord and tenant may be joined aa 
parties, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
20(a) . 
Tenant does not hold under color of title 
against landlord, 67-6-4. 
Nonresidents. 
Under this section a nonresident guard-
ian may maintain a possessory right for his 
ward, who is also a nonresident, through 
P. 227. 
Scope and operation of section. 
This section does not seem to be limited 
to parties actually residing within thia 
state, nor does it establish a rule that 
whore a party settles on the public do-
main, incloses a parcel of land for a farm, 
and makes valuable improvements there-
on, with the bona fide intention of pur-
chasing the same whenever a title could 
be procured from the government, he must 
be constantly present on such land. Actual 
occupancy may be evidenced by an in-
cloaure, and maintained by an agent or 
tenant. Hyndman v[ Stowe, 9 U. 23, 33 
P. 227. 
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